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Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira 
 
Pariah State No More: Belarus’ International Actorness 
against the Backdrop of the Ukraine Conflict 
 
 
The Ukraine conflict has been raising fears and concerns in countries across 
the region, both about the possible spillover of instability and as a result of 
the emergence of a new revisionist Russian posture, which appears to pose an 
existential threat to the survival and sovereignty of states in the region. In 
Belarus, these concerns have evolved together with an unprecedented en-
hancement of the country’s international and diplomatic actorness, which has 
emerged as a result of Belarus’ efforts to promote and host diplomatic nego-
tiations on Ukraine since July 2014. 
By mid-2017, over 60 meetings had been held in various formats, in-
cluding regular meetings of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), comprised 
of senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the OSCE 
Chairperson-in-Office and established to facilitate a diplomatic resolution of 
the Ukraine crisis, and occasional bilateral talks such as those held in August 
2017 between the US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, Kurt 
Volker, and the Assistant to the President of Russia, Vladislav Surkov. Two 
of these sessions were particularly important. The first, known as Minsk I, 
took place in September 2014 and brought together Ukraine, Russia, and the 
leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (the 
DPR and the LPR), with the OSCE represented by Heidi Tagliavini. The sec-
ond, Minsk II, took place in February 2015 in the so-called Normandy For-
mat, consisting of representatives of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. 
The Belarusian leadership also offered to provide the necessary infrastructure 
for further talks. In 2017, Belarus’ international presence has been further 
strengthened by its hosting, for the first time, of the annual session of the 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. At the opening meeting of the event, the 
Belarusian president, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, presented the idea of a global 
security conference – the “Helsinki 2” initiative. 
Each of these initiatives would have seemed highly improbable just four 
years ago, and it was hard to imagine that Western actors would one day be 
praising the Belarusian authorities for their international engagement. In the 
period prior to the Ukraine crisis, Belarus’ relations and political contacts 
with the West had been limited, and sanctions were often a cornerstone of the 
policies of the Western actors. EU sanctions, for instance, in force since 
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2004, were at some point considered “one of the most complete CFSP [the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy] sanctions regimes in force”.1 
The US has not had an ambassador in Minsk since 2008.2  
 
 
Belarus’ Position on the Ukraine Conflict 
 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon referred to Belarus’ position on the 
Ukraine conflict as a “wise policy”.3 Belarus’ own interpretation of its ap-
proach was illustrated by a metaphor used by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Uladzimir Makey: When two brothers fight, the third must reconcile them.4 
This position, as argued below, has not been easy to maintain, as it entailed 
striking a balance between Belarus’ alliance obligations towards Russia on 
the one hand and its pro-Ukraine position, which earned Belarus the appre-
ciation of Ukraine and the West, on the other. 
That Belarus’ position is informed by its close alliance with Russia was 
manifest in Belarus’ vote against UN General Assembly Resolution No. 68/39 
condemning the annexation of Crimea on 27 March 2014. The Belarusian 
leadership has also backed up several key arguments within Moscow’s 
official narrative on Ukraine, including the claim that Russia had no option 
other than to support the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Crimea 
in the face of threats associated with the prospect of Ukraine’s joining NATO 
and increasing restrictions on the use of the Russian language in Ukraine.5  
At the same time, the Belarusian approach diverges from Moscow on a 
number of points. In contrast to Russian diplomats and politicians, who stig-
matize Ukraine’s leadership as a “junta” and as a group of ultranationalist 
radicals who, controlled by the US, lack legitimate and legal authority, Bela-
rus has demonstrated openness towards the Ukrainian leadership from the 
start. The Belarusian president met Ukraine’s interim president Oleksandr 
Turchinov as early as March 2014 and attended the inauguration of President 
Petro Poroshenko in Kyiv in June 2014. Furthermore, while Moscow re-
garded the referenda in eastern Ukraine as legitimate expressions of popular 
                                                 
1  Clara Portela, The European Union and Belarus: Sanctions and partnership? In: Compara-
tive European Politics 4/2011, pp. 486-505, here. p. 487. 
2  The US has recently increased the number of staff serving at its embassy in Minsk, includ-
ing by the appointment and accreditation of Colonel Michael C. VanDeVelde as Defence 
Attaché. 
3  BelTA (Belarusian Telegraph Agency), UN Secretary General praises Belarus’ role in 
handling Ukraine conflict, 22 September 2014, at: http://eng.belta.by/politics/view/un-
secretary-general-praises-belarus-role-in-handling-ukraine-conflict-6819-2014. 
4  Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, Intervyu Ministra inostrannykh 
del Belarusi V. Makeya ispanskomu izdaniyu “El País” (7 iyulya 2017 g., g.Minsk) [In-
terview with Minister for Foreign Affairs U. Makey in the Spanish publication “El Pais”, 
(7 July 2017, Minsk)], at: http://mfa.gov.by/press/smi/afe7d554109e0bfd.html.  
5  Cf. Alena Vyotskaya Guedes Vieira, Ukraine’s Crisis and Russia’s Closest Allies: 
A Reinforced Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma at Work, in: The International Spectator, 
4/2014, pp. 97-111.  
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will that justified major constitutional change, the Belarusian leadership has 
emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and 
independence, stressing that the option of a loose federation would be a de-
stabilizing factor for Ukraine and the region alike. In addition, Belarus 
adopted a relatively cautious approach towards the separatist movements in 
Donetsk and Luhansk: While consistently condemning radicalism in Ukraine, 
the official Belarusian narrative has avoided mentioning the DPR and the 
LPR. In parallel, Belarus has opted to maintain and strengthen economic co-
operation with Ukraine and co-operation on military technology. This in-
cludes continuing to export oil products to Kyiv, which is critical to 
Ukraine’s efforts to maintain its military capabilities and a stable fuel market. 
 
 
Belarus’ Rapprochement with the West: Pariah State No More 
 
Belarus’ efforts to de-escalate the Ukraine conflict are transforming the 
state’s image as an international pariah and “Europe’s last dictatorship”. 
Western actors such as former US Secretary of State John Kerry have ex-
pressed their appreciation of Belarusian “leadership in supporting a peaceful 
resolution to the crisis in Ukraine and its commitment to good relations with 
all the countries”.6 The European Council similarly maintained that it “values 
Belarus’ constructive role in the region”.7 This appreciation of Belarusian ef-
forts has enabled a fundamental shift in Belarus’ relations with the West. 
In February 2016, following five years of sanctions, the EU lifted most 
of its restrictive measures against Belarus (they had already been suspended 
in October 2015), while maintaining the arms embargo and sanctions on four 
members of the security services suspected of being involved in political dis-
appearances in 1999-2000. The lifted measures included visa bans and asset 
freezes targeting 170 individuals, including the Belarusian president. The 
EU’s decision was facilitated by the release of political prisoners in Belarus 
in August 2015, including Mikalai Statkevich, a presidential candidate in 
2010. In 2016, the EU increased its bilateral assistance to Belarus, with 
roughly half of the financing earmarked for the support of private sector de-
velopment.8 In 2015, the US Department of the Treasury suspended sanctions 
against nine Belarusian companies, including Belnaftekhim, the state petro-
chemical company and Belarus’ largest oil refiner. Since then, these sanc-
tions relief measures have been renewed every six months, with the most re-
                                                 
6  U.S. Embassy in Belarus, Statement by Secretary Kerry on the Occasion of the National 
Day of the Republic of Belarus (July 3), at: https://by.usembassy.gov/statement-secretary-
kerry-occasion-national-day-republic-belarus-july-3. 
7  European Council/Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Belarus. 
15 February 2016, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/15-
fac-belarus-conclusions. 
8  Cf. European Commission, New EU support to private sector development and strength-
ening institutions in Belarus, Brussels, 19 September 2016, at: http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_MEMO-16-3107_en.htm.  
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cent general licence covering the period from April 2017 to the end of Octo-
ber 2017. Restrictive measures against members of the political and secret 
service elite, including the Belarusian president, have remained in place.9 
When the riot police brutally dispersed peaceful protesters in Minsk in 
March 2017, an action that was accompanied by a wave of detentions, both 
the US and the EU voiced concern and condemned the crackdown. A Euro-
pean Parliament resolution of 6 April 2017 recalled that the EU sanctions had 
been lifted “as a gesture of goodwill to encourage Belarus to improve its 
human rights, democracy and rule of law record”, indicating that new restric-
tive measures would be considered if the Belarusian authorities failed to con-
duct an impartial investigation into possible arbitrary detentions and in-
fringements of the protesters’ human rights.10 However, no further sanctions 
were introduced against Belarus by either the US or the EU. 
Domestically, the demonstrations have once again shown that internal 
dissent, this time stemming from the so-called “social parasite tax” (requiring 
unemployed citizens who work less than 183 days a year to pay a 230 euro 
tax), could be mobilized in Belarus. The authorities’ reaction was hardly sur-
prising; the Ukraine conflict has served as a reminder of how rapidly internal 
destabilization can put an end to a political regime. Meanwhile, the Belarus-
ian leadership was facing a new reality, with the dangers to its regime no 
longer stemming exclusively from the political liberalization promoted by the 
West but also from the possibility of Moscow’s rapid exploitation of unrest. 
This explains in part the Belarusian authorities’ relatively restrained response 
in March 2017, which avoided long-term detentions and even harsher meas-
ures, contrary to the habitual behaviour of the regime. Fines and short prison 
sentences for the detained protesters were sufficient to send a signal that Rus-
sia had no basis on which to interfere and that the Belarusian authorities had 
the situation under control, while avoiding the possible deterioration of its 
relationship with the West. Indeed, the rapprochement between Belarus and 
the West has continued. In July 2017 alone, the Belarusian authorities re-
ceived a US Congressional delegation (led by Senator Roger Wicker) and 
four further delegations, including a British Parliamentary delegation, a dele-
gation consisting of senior representatives of the French and German foreign 
ministries, a delegation with the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Edgars 
Rinkēvičs, and a delegation from the European Parliament, led by Bogdan 
Zdrojewski. This final visit was the result of negotiations on the participation 
of members of Belarus’ House of Representatives in the Euronest Parlia-
mentary Assembly, the interparliamentary forum of the EU’s Eastern Part-
                                                 
9  Cf. The White House, Letter from the President – National Emergencies Act, 13 June 
2017, at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-national-
emergencies-act. 
10  European Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2017 on the situation in Belarus, Strasbourg, 
6 April 2017, at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference= 
P8-TA-2017-0126&format=XML&language=EN. 
In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2017, Baden-Baden 2018, pp. 79-89.
 83
nership. Thus far, members of the Belarusian opposition have been con-
sidered the only legitimate representatives of the country.11  
To be sure, this was not the first time there had been rapprochement 
with the West and the lifting of sanctions. Back in 2008, for instance, Bela-
rus’ relations with the West had been warming,12 at least until this thaw was 
interrupted by mass arrests following the December 2010 presidential elec-
tions and Western actors introduced stricter sanctions, such as those imposed 
by the EU in January and June 2011. The crucial difference in Belarus-
Western rapprochement in the new, post-2014 context resides in the new 
meaning ascribed to it by Minsk, namely as a means of guaranteeing Bela-
rusian sovereignty. In other words, the government in Minsk has started to 
see Belarus’ independence as having been “strengthened as a result of our ef-
forts to develop trade and humanitarian relations with the European and 
American partners”.13 This perception is shared by Western actors: US sanc-
tions relief has been “designed to support Belarus’ economic independence”, 
to “increase Belarus’ political independence, and to support its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity”.14 The ensuing pattern of interaction between Belarus 
and the West is thus fundamentally different from that which had prevailed 
previously, when Belarus used the conditions imposed by the EU and the US 
to extract benefits from Moscow.15 
Belarus’ sovereignty could no longer be taken for granted: The events in 
Ukraine, and especially Crimea, were completely unexpected, and the possi-
bility that they could be repeated in Belarus could not be ignored. In 2015, 
Belarus undertook a mass mobilization of its reservists and amended the laws 
“On Defence” and “On Martial Law”, while the new Military Doctrine adopted 
in 2016 speaks of “internal armed conflict” in reference to the possibility of a 
Donbas-type scenario.16 The authorities are now supporting a policy of na-
                                                 
11  Cf. Grigory Ioffe, Belarus Gains New Friends, While Lukashenka Retains His Popularity 
Region-Wide, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor 99/2016, at: https://jamestown.org/program/ 
belarus-gains-new-friends-while-lukashenka-retains-his-popularity-region-wide. 
12  Cf. Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, Opening the European Commission’s Delegation in 
Minsk: Do EU-Belarus relations need a rethink? The Finnish Institute of International Af-
fairs Briefing Paper 18. 7 April 2008, at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55765/ 
20080407_Opening_the_European_Commission.pdf; Elena Kropacheva, Presidential 
Election in Belarus in 2010: The Winner Takes It All? In: Institute for Peace Research and 
Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2011, Baden-
Baden 2012, pp. 87-105.  
13  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, cited above (Note 4; author’s 
translation).  
14  U.S. Embassy in Belarus, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia 
Bridget Brink Remarks to the Press, 19 October 2016, at: https://by.usembassy.gov/ 
deputy-assistant-secretary-state-europe-eurasia-bridget-brink-remarks-press-3. 
15  Cf. Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, The Many Patterns of Europeanization: European 
Union Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, in: Teresa Cierco (ed), The European 
Union Neighbourhood: Challenges and Opportunities, Farnham 2013, pp. 57-82. 
16  Cf. Arseni Sivitski, Belarus’s New Military Doctrine: What’s the Message? BelarusDi-
gest, 1 September 2016, at: https://belarusdigest.com/story/belaruss-new-military-
doctrine-whats-the-message; Siarhei Bohdan, Is Lukashenka Preparing for a War? Bela-
In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2017, Baden-Baden 2018, pp. 79-89.
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tional revival. The idea, broached by some Russian political actors, that Bela-
rus should be part of the “Russian World” (or even Russia itself) and that 
ethnic Russians living in Belarus need protection has been vigorously re-
jected at the highest political level.  
The rapprochement between Belarus and the West raised the question of 
whether Western actors might de-emphasize the issue of democratic reforms, 
which has thus far been a cornerstone of EU, US, OSCE, and Council of Eur-
ope engagement with the Belarusian leadership. There was a growing under-
standing among Western actors that Belarus needed to be rewarded for its ef-
forts to prevent the escalation of the Ukraine conflict. A shift in priorities 
could be confirmed to the extent that sanctions had been lifted in spite of the 
lack of substantial progress in undertaking reforms.  
Western actors committed to supporting democratic reforms in Belarus 
eventually faced a new dilemma. In order to maintain consistency in their en-
gagement with the Belarusian authorities, they had to continue to call for 
democratic reforms and improvements to the human rights situation. This 
would require them to impose strict sanctions as often as necessary. How-
ever, this brought with it the danger that the Belarusian regime would, in its 
isolation, become ever more dependent on Russia, as had happened before. 
And the possibility of growing Russian influence over Belarus (or even its 
absorption by Moscow) would hardly be good news for Belarus, the region, 
or the West. 
 
 
The Politics of the Russia-Belarus Alliance 
 
The alliance between Russia and Belarus has become the subject of some 
controversy in the context of the Ukraine conflict.17 Differences in the allies’ 
interests have become more evident, and each side has developed concerns 
about the other’s reliability. The ensuing tension, known as the intra-alliance 
security dilemma, has reinforced both Russia’s “fear of abandonment” and 
Belarus’ “fear of entrapment”. The former refers to the fear of being deserted 
or losing support and is based on the perception of a risk that the partner will 
defect, taking into account the cost to the other ally of doing so. The fear of 
entrapment, in turn, refers to the possibility of being dragged, via one’s alli-
ance commitments, into a conflict over interests held by an ally, even though 
one might not be a party to those interests.18 
                                                                                                         
rusDigest, 5 February 2017, at: https://belarusdigest.com/story/is-lukashenka-preparing-
for-a-war.  
17  The alliance between Russia and Belarus is based upon a Treaty of Friendship, Good-
Neighborliness and Cooperation (1995) and a Defence Pact (1997). In practical terms, it 
consists in a joint army group and a common air defence system. See: Alena Vieira, The 
Politico-Military Alliance of Russia and Belarus: Re-Examining the Role of NATO and 
the EU in Light of the Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma, in: Europe-Asia Studies 4/2014, 
pp. 557-577.  
18  Cf. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, Ithaca, NY, 1997.  
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One of the issues that testify to the complexity of the bilateral relation-
ship concerns Russian plans to establish an airbase on Belarusian territory. 
Belarus’ traditional importance to Russia as a strategic buffer and a means of 
reinforcing Russia’s strategic depth has increased sharply following the rede-
ployment of NATO and US aircraft in the region and plans to strengthen their 
military presence in the Baltic Sea region and Poland.19 Starting in 2013, 
Russia’s fear of abandonment, reinforced by Belarus’ rapprochement with the 
West, led the Russian leadership to push for the creation of the airbase. This 
included making public a draft agreement on the establishment of the base, 
which appeared on Russia’s official government website on 8 September 
2015.20  
For its part, Belarus’ opposition to the airbase proposal is informed by 
its fear of entrapment, i.e. of being drawn into a conflict between Russia and 
the West, which has been reinforced by concerns over Belarus’ own sover-
eignty. The draft agreement released in Russia in September 2015 has never 
been signed by Belarus; the Belarusian president claimed not to know any-
thing about it.21 Belarus has since voiced its reservations, with the Belarusian 
minister for foreign affairs maintaining that the airbase does not make sense 
since “modern armaments allow Russia to react equally rapidly from its own 
territory”, adding that Belarus “would like to avoid being a factor of ten-
sion/irritation in the region”.22 
Another case of contentious alliance politics concerns the joint Russia-
Belarus “Zapad 2017” military exercise. Planned to be held in Belarus on 14-
20 September 2017, the drills raised NATO’s and Ukraine’s concerns about 
the possibility of Russian troops’ remaining on Belarusian territory following 
the conclusion of the exercises. The Belarusian side has been especially eager 
to mitigate its Western neighbours’ concerns and to ensure that the drills do 
not become a source of tension. As well as inviting military observers from 
NATO and non-NATO countries, the OSCE, and the Red Cross, Minsk 
began to provide advance briefings on the exercise to NATO and other West-
ern countries, paralleling the provision of similar information by Russia.23 
The Belarusian president has personally reassured Kyiv that Belarus will not 
                                                 
19  In the case of armed conflict with NATO, Belarusian territory also becomes crucial to 
Russia as a means of establishing a land connection with its Kaliningrad exclave, closing 
the so-called Suwalki Gap, which is crucial in geostrategic terms as a means of separating 
the Baltic states from other NATO allies. 
20  The draft did not specify the exact location of the base or the military units to be de-
ployed. Cf. Yury Tsarik, A Containing Ally: Belarus’ Regional Role in the Context of the 
New Containment, KKI Studies, T-2016/7, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Buda-
pest, 2016, p. 12, at: http://old.csfps.by/files/files/07_kki-studies_blr_tsarik_20160919. 
pdf. 
21  Cf. BBC, Belarus “does not need” Russia air base – Lukashenko, 7 October 2015, at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34463901. 
22  Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, cited above (Note 4). 
23  Cf. Brian Whitmore, The Morning Vertical, RFL/RL, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/the-
morning-vertical-august-17-2017/28681680.html. 
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become a platform for aggression against Ukraine.24 The Belarusian efforts 
seemed to bear fruit: On 19 July, after meeting his Belarusian counterpart, 
Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs announced that Riga no longer 
had any questions for Minsk concerning the forthcoming military exercise.25 
The intra-alliance security dilemma between Russia and Belarus also af-
fects domestic policy and has an economic and an energy dimension, as these 
are the most sensitive areas of co-operation between Belarus and Russia. 
Cases in point are the sanctions Russia imposed on Ukraine in 2013 and the 
retaliatory sanctions on imports of certain food products from the EU and 
other Western countries in 2014.26 Belarus has joined neither of these sanc-
tions regimes. This was based on a desire to avoid a deterioration in political 
relations with Ukraine and the West and to take advantage of new opportun-
ities to trade with both Ukraine and Russia.  
The Belarusian leadership has been eager to mitigate Russia’s fear of 
abandonment by restating its commitment to the alliance, reiterating that it 
would continue to be honoured even if the military situation escalated.27 
Belarusian diplomats have also been keen to emphasize that Minsk’s position 
on Ukraine was not aimed at undermining Russia’s security and that Belarus 
is not pursuing the goal of improving relations with the West at Russia’s ex-
pense.28 These declarations could not prevent Russia from retaliating, how-
ever, and measures imposed by Moscow since 2015 in particular have led to 
an abrupt reduction in the volume of oil exported to Belarus (which is critical 
for its economy), to trade bans and restrictions, and to the re-emergence of 
border controls between the parties.29 Russia did not hesitate to adopt these 
measures against its Belarusian ally even though they undermined the single 
economic space of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a key foreign 
policy priority for Moscow since 2010. The new circumstances clearly indi-
cated the need to seek a new approach to alliance management, but a solution 
                                                 
24  Cf. Egor Kucher, Poroshenko: Lukashenko zaveril, chto iz Belorussii ne budet agressii 
[Poroshenko: Lukashenko has assured me that there will be no aggression launched from 
Belarusian territory], in: Izvestiya, 21 July 2017. at: https://iz.ru/622403/2017-07-21/ 
poroshenko-lukashenko-zaveril-chto-iz-belorussii-ne-budet-agressii. 
25  Cf. Belarusian Television Channel CTV, Latvia’s Foreign Ministry: We have no questions 
to Belarus concerning Zapad-2017 military drills, at: http://en.ctv.by/en/1500492784-
belarus-national-bank-decreases-refinancing-rate-by-12-per-annum. 
26  Cf. Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, Eurasian integration: elite perspectives before and 
after the Ukraine crisis, in: Post-Soviet Affairs 6/2016, pp. 566-580.  
27  Cf. BelTA (Belarusian Telegraph Agency), Belarus i Rossiya adekvatno reagiruyut na 
usilenie NATO u granits Soyuznogo gosudarstva – Lukashenko [Belarus and Russia Re-
spond Adequately to NATO Build-up at the Border of the Union State – Lukashenko], 
7 June 2016, at: http://www.belta.by/president/view/belarus-i-rossija-adekvatno-reagirujut-
na-usilenie-nato-u-granits-sojuznogo-gosudarstva-lukashenko-196423-2016. 
28  Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, cited above (Note 4). 
29  Cf. Alena Vieira, A Tale of Two Unions: Russia-Belarus Integration Experience and its 
Lessons for the Eurasian Economic Union, in: Journal of Borderland Studies 1/2017, 
pp. 41-53. In February 2017, Russia designated “border control zones” in the regions of 
Smolensk, Pskov, and Bryansk, which border Belarus. This move followed Belarus’ deci-
sion in January 2017 to abolish short-term entrance visas for visitors from some 80 
countries (including all EU member states, the US, and Japan). 
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has not been found. The nature of the Russia-Belarus alliance has been 
changing, as reflected in the readjustment of Belarus’ role as Russia’s “hy-
brid”30, or even “containing”31, ally. 
 
 
Towards a New Co-operation Space between the East and the West? 
 
From 5 to 9 July 2017, Belarus hosted a session of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly (PA) of the OSCE, which was attended by 700 delegates from 57 coun-
tries.32 This was the first time it had done so. As the Belarusian president 
Alexander Lukashenka confessed, he could have hardly imagined a session of 
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Minsk “just three years ago”.33 In his 
opening address, the Belarusian president proffered his idea of a new Hel-
sinki process, “Helsinki 2”, a broad dialogue aimed at overcoming the exist-
ing differences in relations between the countries in the Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian region.34 If the idea were to find support, Lukashenka suggested that 
the OSCE could announce, “as early as next year”, “an enlarged OSCE meet-
ing […] and start preparations for the final summit”.35 Belarus could become 
the venue for the proposed comprehensive dialogue. 
The ideas behind the Helsinki 2 initiative had previously been conveyed 
during the conferences and summits organized during Belarus’ Chairmanship 
of the Central European Initiative (CEI), which Belarus also assumed for the 
first time in January 2017. The conferences and summits involved strength-
ening co-operation between individual integration initiatives and were ac-
companied by an appeal to the countries situated between Europe and Asia to 
take on more responsibility for fostering regional stability.36 These proposals 
                                                 
30  Cf. Yevhen Magda in an interview with Vital Tsygankov: Ukraіnskі palіtolyag: Lukashjenka 
– heta hіbrydny sayuznіk Ukraіny [Ukrainian political analyst: Lukashenko – a hybrid ally 
of Ukraine], Radio Svaboda, 17 August 2017, at: https://www.svaboda.org/a/28682470.html. 
31  Cf. Tsarik, cited above (Note 20); Yevhen Magda in an interview with Vital Tsygankov, 
cited above (Note 30). 
32  The Belarusian delegation (four out of six members) has voted in favour of the Minsk 
Declaration. The Declaration includes a condemnation of Russia’s “hybrid aggression 
against Ukraine in Donbas” and urges Russia to “reverse the temporary occupation of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol” and to “stop sponsoring 
terrorist activities in Ukraine through the inflow of fighters, money, and weapons”. OSCE 
PA, Resolution on Restoration of the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, in: 
Minsk Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the 
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in turn built upon the idea, actively promoted by the Belarusian leadership 
back in 2011, of the “integration of integrations”, which envisaged a specific 
role for Belarus in bringing the EAEU and the EU closer together. 
The active role Belarus has played in these international forums attests 
to its aspiration to build upon its improved diplomatic standing and translate 
the official narrative that it is a source of stability and security in Europe into 
tangible policy. One issue with this, however, is the extent to which the Bela-
rusian authorities are prepared to work towards gaining the legitimacy ex-
pected of an international norm entrepreneur. Belarus’ previous engagement 
with the West was largely a means for it to extract benefits from co-operation 
with Russia, and it was thus unnecessary for the Belarusian leadership to 
strive towards recognition from the West. But Belarus’ international aspir-
ations and engagement now make Western recognition crucial. It may even 
become imperative for the Belarusian authorities to revise their position re-
garding citizens exercising their individual, civil, and political rights instead 
of merely restraining from persecuting the opposition or occasionally chan-
ging legislation. James Sherr has aptly summarized the paradox resulting 
from Belarus’ pursuit of its international ambitions in the absence of signifi-
cant reform progress: “Belarus can build bridges to the West, but under its 
current regime it cannot go there”.37 Indeed, the crackdown on peaceful pro-
testers on 25 March 2017, the anniversary of the declaration of the short-lived 
1918 Belarusian People’s Republic, served as a reminder that a fundamental 





Belarus’ position on the Ukraine conflict shows that the image it has had in 
the West as the “last dictatorship of Europe” and a “pariah state” is no longer 
accurate. A rapprochement has taken place between Belarus and the West as 
a consequence of the latter’s positive view of Belarusian diplomatic efforts 
on Ukraine. The Belarusian leadership has in turn started to assign a different 
meaning to its co-operation with the West, namely as a means of guarantee-
ing its own sovereignty. The dilemma arising for the Western actors in this 
respect has been how to reconcile their co-operation with a Belarus that is fo-
cused on guaranteeing its own sovereignty with the emphasis on human 
rights and political freedoms that has been a cornerstone of previous Western 
engagement with Belarus. Meanwhile, the Belarusian leadership has faced 
new dilemmas of its own. It has been more difficult for Belarus to strike a 
balance between its alliance obligations towards Russia and its pro-Ukraine 
position, as is apparent in tensions between the two allies over a number of 
issues, including Russia’s planned airbase in Belarus, the Zapad 2017 exer-
                                                 
37  James Sherr, The New East-West Discord. Russian Objectives, Western Interests, Clingen-
dael Report. December 2015. 
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cise, and growing disagreements over trade and energy matters. Furthermore, 
the launch of new proposals on global security co-operation, such as Helsinki 
2, which testified to Belarus’ international ambitions, eventually raised the 
question of the extent to which the Belarusian leadership was prepared to 
change in order to act as an international norm entrepreneur. With no sub-
stantial reform progress, Belarus’ diplomatic activism remains only one of 
many necessary steps towards its international legitimacy and acceptance. 
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